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I. INTRODUCTION
The term "creeping legalism," the topic of this symposium, applies to several
different developments in labor arbitration. This essay examines each of those
developments and explains why that pejorative term misses its mark.
The first generation of complaints about creeping legalism in labor arbitration
occurred fifty years ago, when parties and commentators worried about then-
recent trends toward the introduction of such pernicious legalisms as the use of
lawyers and the citation of previous awards. I refer to this set of charges as pro-
cedural legalism.
The second generation began shortly after the passage of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. Commentators (but at this time not many parties) engaged in vigorous
debate about the possibility that labor arbitrators might be asked to decide statuto-
ry issues affecting the administration of collective bargaining agreements. I refer
to this set of criticisms as substantive legalism.
Webster Professor of Labor Law Emeritus, University of South Carolina School of Law. This
reflective essay contains judgments based on three decades of practicing labor arbitration as well as
teaching and writing about it. I dedicate this paper to the late Tim Heinsz, my friend and co-author and
former Dean at the University of Missouri School of Law.
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The third generation is very recent indeed, born just after the Supreme
Court's 2009 decision in 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett.' Pyett simply held that a
union could, if it wished, enter into legally enforceable agreements confining in-
dividual members' statutory claims exclusively to the contractual grievance pro-
cedure. 2 Critics of the decision worried that Pyett would deprive unionized em-
ployees of their right to sue for violations of federal and state labor laws.3 While
this line of criticism is not yet fully developed, it seems to involve a blend of pro-
cedural and substantive concerns. For convenience, then, let us refer to those
criticisms as hybrid legalism.
One factor linking all three versions of the creeping legalism complaint, I
suggest, is that they are declension myths. Let me begin by explaining what I
mean by that term. I will then apply it to each of type of legalism in turn. It is
common for scholars to structure their analysis of an issue as a declension narra-
tive-that is, as a story of the decline and fall of whatever it is. The most com-
mon declension myth, of course, is the story of Adam and Eve found in the Book
of Genesis, 4 although there were some earlier examples and innumerable later
ones. So common is that structure, in fact, that it has become a veritable "meme,"
5
a unit of cultural information passed on by repeated use.
Declension narratives normally share a common multi-step format. Initially,
they posit the existence of a prelapsarian paradise when all was in harmony: the
lion lay down with the lamb, people were nice to one another, and justice reigned
throughout the world. Next, they assert that some human sin caused our expulsion
from that earthly paradise, forcing us to live in an imperfect world. Lastly, they
argue that by some reformation-by repenting for our sins, for example-we can
regain paradise. Later examples of declension myths are everywhere: the decline
of Rome, the Rousseauian view of the decline of society since the primeval state
of nature, and Marxist analysis of economic changes following primitive com-
munities, to name just a few.
I'm not a theologian, so I will spare you my thoughts on the doctrine of origi-
nal sin. As to the declination narrative of creeping legalism in labor arbitration,
however, I find three flaws. One, the first analytical step is false. There was nev-
er a paradisiacal time for labor arbitration. It was always imperfect, even though
we might have forgotten its flaws. Two, the second step is faise. No human sins
destroyed the Platonic ideal of labor arbitration. Rather, the contexts of labor
arbitration and the parties' needs and expectations changed over the decades so
that the older version became progressively outdated. Parties themselves adapted
labor arbitration to meet their new needs. Three, the third step is also false. Noth-
ing we can do will ever reverse the clock and make the earlier non-legalized ver-
sion of labor arbitration suitable for our times. Even if we could, I am confident
we would not want to do so.
1. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009).
2. Id. at 1474.
3. See Part IV, infra.
4. Genesis 3.
5. While thinking about this topic, I momentarily considered writing a book titled The Decline and
Fall of Practically Everything-until a quick Google search of that title produced 442 hits, most nota-
bly to Joe Queenan's 1992 book, IMPERIAL CADDY: THE RISE OF DAN QUAYLE IN AMERICA AND THE
DECLINE AND FALL OF PRACTICALLY EVERYTHING ELSE. Even the debunking of declension narratives
has itself become a meme.
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Let me turn now to explaining how the concept of declension myths applies
to each of the generations of creeping legalism complaints.
II. PROCEDURAL LEGALISM: THE INTRODUCTION OF LEGAL PRACTICES
To appreciate the changes in labor arbitration that prompted the first creeping
legalism charges, one must first recall how labor arbitration began.6 While some
forms of labor arbitration have existed for more than a century, the earliest exam-
ples bear little similarity to modern arbitration. Industrial alternative dispute reso-
lution arose to address disagreements over the terms of employment, particularly
wages and hours-what today we term interest disputes. There were no collective
bargaining agreements as we know them and thus there were few of what we
would recognize as rights disputes, or grievances over the interpretation or appli-
cation of a collective agreement.7 Even when a written agreement ended a strike,
the terms of the agreement were usually so limited that any subsequent procedure
required the parties or some outside decision-maker to supplement, rather than
interpret, the original bargain.
In short, parties, government officials, and academics loosely and interchan-
geably described any use of third parties in the resolution of those early labor
disputes as arbitration, conciliation, and mediation. We have a clear taxonomy of
dispute resolution; our predecessors did not. That blurring of lines continued even
after labor arbitration began to take something like its modern shape in the 1930s
and 1940s. Just as the clothing workers and their employers appointed such legal
figures as Louis Brandeis and Clarence Darrow as arbitrators but expected them to
function more as mediators, so too the mid-century "umpires" in textiles, automo-
biles, and other industries used whatever tools they could find to solve pressing
practical problems.
It would never have occurred to them or to the parties that appointed them
that they should only read and apply an existing document. Rather, their mutually
understood role was to mediate, negotiate, nudge, and persuade the parties to set-
tle, and only as a last resort to issue a formal ruling. Even in that last resort, the
ruling was more likely to set the terms of employment than to apply the words the
parties had already negotiated. Because almost every case was a matter of first
impression, there were no precedents. Because critical interest issues like wages
were at stake, the parties' representatives were typically the leaders of each organ-
ization, not their lawyers. Because the parties were still negotiating, there was
seldom any need to examine and cross-examine witnesses. A fly on the wall at an
early arbitration would have seen something much closer to bargaining than to
litigation.
There are not many good reports of the conduct of those early arbitrations.
They were, after all, informal and therefore not recorded. Some descriptions do
appear in studies of early arbitrators like William Morris Leiserson8 and George
6. This description of the history of labor arbitration draws extensively on Dennis R. Nolan and
Roger I. Abrams, American Labor Arbitration: The Early Years, 35 FLA. L. REV. 373 (1983) and
American Labor Arbitration: The Maturing Years, 35 FLA. L. REV. 557 (1983).
7. On the distinction between interest disputes and rights disputes, see, e.g., ELKOURI & ELKOURI,
How ARBITRATION WORKS 108-11 (6th ed. 2003).
8. See J. EISNER, WILLIAM MORRIS LEISERSON: A BIOGRAPHY (1967).
No. 1] Disputatio 3
3
Nolan: Nolan: Disputatio
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2010
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Taylor,9 and in histories of industries like clothinglo and coal mining." One very
useful collection, however, is Samuel R. Zack's Arbitration of Labor Disputes:
Cases From an Arbitrator's Files.12 Zack was a very busy New York arbitrator
who-astonishingly-had a radio show about labor arbitration in New York and
Washington for six years. No other arbitrator, before or since, ever commanded
so much public attention. Each week Zack presented one of his labor arbitration
cases. The book collects many of his stories.
Zack's stories have to be read to be appreciated, but they typically reveal the
informality of the process at the time. The parties gather at the table with the
arbitrator and state their positions, often with some back-and-forth and question-
ing. When Zack does not, like Perry Mason, ferret out some previously unknown
but decisive fact, he negotiates with the parties to come up with a compromise.
There is nothing wrong with using what we would today call med-arb in appropri-
ate circumstances, but often it leads to solutions that carry their own flaws. In one
dispute between competing unions in a plant, for example, the representation
problem was complicated by the employer's hiring of new employees. Each
competing union worried that new hires might join the other. To avoid upsetting
the balance, Arbitrator Zack directed the parties to enroll new employees alter-
nately in the opposing unions-one to the AFL affiliate, the next to the CIO affili-
ate, completely without consideration of the employees' wishes.
More importantly, Zack's stories reveal that the parties either had no collec-
tive bargaining agreement or that their brief agreement did not cover the problems
that arose during its term. The arbitrator therefore created the rules as he worked.
Quite frequently, the bargaining relationship itself was quite new. Again, crea-
tive, conciliatory dispute resolution can be useful in such a situation. That form of
arbitration was certainly different from later models, but there is no reason to con-
clude that it was better in any absolute sense even in that setting, let alone today.
By the late 1950s, however, the process had begun to change, and those
changes led to the complaints of creeping legalism. The first use of that term that
I have found was in the title of a 1958 editorial in the Arbitration Journal of the
American Arbitration Association (AAA).13 The editorial revealed the source of
the new phrase when it quoted Professor Emanuel Stein as stating that "[a] fru-
strating kind of legalism has crept into labor relations because the arbitrator has
come to function like a judge and the parties have come to treat arbitration like
litigation, with all the canons of construction familiar to the law of contracts."l 4
9. INDUSTRIAL PEACEMAKER: GEORGE W. TAYLOR'S CONTRIBUTION TO COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING (Edward B. Shils, et al., eds., 1979).
10. E.g., THE CHICAGO JOINT BOARD, AMALGAMATED CLOTHING WORKERS OF AMERICA, THE
CLOTHING WORKERS OF CHICAGO 1910-1922 (1922); RITA MORGAN, ARBITRATION IN THE MEN'S
CLOTHING INDUSTRY IN NEW YORK CITY: A CASE STUDY OF INDUSTRIAL ARBITRATION AND
CONFERENCE METHOD WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO ITS EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS (1940).
11. E.g., Waldo E. Fisher, Bituminous Coal, in How COLLECTIVE BARGAINING WORKS 229 (Harry
A. Millis ed., 1942); T.D. Nicholls, The Anthracite Board of Conciliation, 36 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & Soc. SCI. 366 (1910).
12. SAMUEL R. ZACK, ARBITRATION OF LABOR DISPUTES: CASES FROM AN ARBITRATOR'S FILES
(1947).
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What was it about contemporary labor arbitration that bothered the AAA?
One of the two examples the editorial provides was a contract-interpretation case
in which both parties cited published awards and the arbitrator relied on one of
them in making the ultimate holding.'" The other example was a discharge case in
which the arbitrator cited numerous arbitration and court cases bearing on prelim-
inary issues like the burden of proof, the definition of self defense, and so on.16
The editorial did not cite or quote the opinions,' 7 so readers of the journal have no
way to determine whether the arbitrators' approaches were justified.
And that was it: creeping legalism seemed to refer to an arbitrator's citation
of other awards.
To be sure, there was more to it than that. Citations were, in reality, just one
aspect of procedural legalism that happened to catch the eye of the Arbitration
Journal's editorial writer. There were many more. The best summary of the
complaints, which came very late in that game, was a 1983 law review article by
Anthony Bartlett.' These included, among other things, the use of lawyers, ob-
jections to some testimony and exhibits, transcripts, and briefs.19 The lawyers, in
other words, were the worm in the apple, the cause of labor arbitration's fall from
grace. Let them in the room, the first critics of creeping legalism seemed to say,
and soon the whole orchard is rotten.
If, in this declension myth, nascent arbitration was Paradise and lawyers
caused the fall, how could we regain the Garden of Eden? Well, simple: just
banish the lawyers and all their paraphernalia and go back to the earlier model.
Of course it really isn't that simple. Nor, I would contend, is it possible or
even desirable. The reason for the changes derided by creeping legalism critics is
not that lawyers burst unasked into the hearing rooms and took over the proceed-
ings. Rather, two very distinct models of arbitration arose and competed, and the
quasi-judicial model triumphed over the mediatorial model. One can follow the
debate in the writings of two champions, George Taylor of the Wharton School,
for the informal approach, and J. Noble Braden, a vice president of the American
Arbitration Association, for the more formal approach. The two argued in various
journals beginning in the late 1940s.2o Taylor lost the debate-in fact, time had
passed him by even as he wrote. Labor and management had already begun to
formalize their arbitrations.2 1
As Richard Mittenthal explained in 1991, the parties had grown up. In the




18. Anthony F. Bartlett, Labor Arbitration: The Problem of Legalism, 62 OR. L. REV. 195 (1983).
19. Id. at 206-10.
20. Taylor's main writings on this subject were The Arbitration of Labor Disputes, I ARB. J. (n.s.)
409 (1946); Effectuating the Labor Contract Through Arbitration, 7 PROC. OF TH4E NAT. ACAD. OF
ARB. 20 (1957) (reprinting a talk he delivered before the Second Annual Meeting of the National
Academy of Arbitrators in 1949); and Further Remarks on Grievance Arbitration, 4 ARB. J. (n.s.) 92
(1949). Braden's contributions were Problems in Labor Arbitration, 13 Mo. L. REV. 142 (1948);
Arbitration and Arbitration Provisions, N.Y.U. 2ND ANN. CONF. ON LABOR 355 (1949); and Current
Problems in Labor-Management Arbitration, 6 ARB. J. (n.s.) 91 (1951).
21. See Nolan & Abrams, The Maturing Years, supra note 6, at 611-13 (1983); Richard Mittenthal,
Whither Arbitration?, 44 PROC. OF THE NAT. ACAD. OF ARB. 35 (1992).
22. See Mittenhal, supra note 21, at 39-40.
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resolve their disputes without committing economic murder or suicide. As they
grew, they developed "high levels of sophistication in collective bargaining" and
"surrounded themselves with a battery of specialists." 23 Collective bargaining
agreements grew in length and detail. As Mittenthal explained:
The gaps have been filled; the generalizations have been made specific.
Things are no longer left to chance. The parties realize they can general-
ly do for themselves what they once expected arbitrators to do for them.
They have made their agreements look more like contracts, less like a
code or a constitution.24
Given those changes, Mittenthal concludes, it is hardly surprising that parties
grew dissatisfied with Taylor-model arbitrators and moved toward the Braden
model.2 As the older, Taylor-like umpires moved on, parties chose Braden-like
private judges and used their lawyers-and their lawyers' skills-to argue before
the quasi-judicial arbitrators. Yale Law School Professor Harry Shulman was a
Taylor-style umpire for Ford and the United Auto Workers between 1943 and
261955. He exercised tremendous discretion when resolving grievances. When he
died in 1955, however, the parties replaced him with Harry Platt and instructed
Platt that they wanted him only to interpret and apply their contracts as written. 27
Indeed, says Mittenthal, the result was inevitable:
All the forces I have mentioned-the parties' needs, their increasing so-
phistication, their more detailed agreements, the influence of lawyers, the
use of precedent, the publishing of awards, the intrusion of law, and so
on-have combined to make labor arbitration appear more and more like
any other quasi-judicial proceeding. . . . In view of the forces that have
been at work, I do not see how this competition between Braden and
Taylor could have been resolved differently. 28
In fact, while the changes Mittenthal mentions certainly facilitated the tri-
umph of the Braden model, the shift wasn't really inevitable. Some parties happi-
ly retain the informal approach even today.29 At any point they want, parties are
free to reject formalized arbitration. Some do so in specific ways, for example, by
choosing not to use lawyers, transcripts, or briefs, or by asking arbitrators for
bench rulings or very quick summary rulings. However, those are individual
cost/benefit decisions by parties to a specific bargaining relationship. They do not
demonstrate the general superiority of informal over formal arbitration.
23. Id.
24. Id. (footnote omitted).
25. Id. at 36.
26. Id. at 40.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 46.
29. To give just one example, I serve as the permanent umpire for a major tobacco company that has
followed the Taylor approach ever since the plant was organized. The parties have never even hinted
that they would like to formalize their proceedings or limit the arbitrator's power.
6 [Vol. 2010
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For the most part, however, Mittenthal is correct. Once the parties grew up,
so to speak, the risks posed by an omnipotent arbitrator-king far outweighed the
benefits.
That is the first declension myth. Before procedural legalism, arbitration was
different and presumably satisfactory, but not necessarily better. The simple form
of arbitration carried its own flaws, chiefly the inability to engage in the sort of
fact-finding and fact-testing possible in a more legalized form of arbitration.
Nor was there any human sin that brought about the Fall. Instead, arbitration
adapted to meet new circumstances and changed needs. Modem, legalistic labor
arbitration suits the parties' current needs, just as the informal, mediatorial arbitra-
tion fulfilled the needs of their predecessors. Moreover, many of the practices
detractors brand as legalism are simply routine litigation techniques designed to
ensure effective presentation of evidence and arguments and, in discipline cases,
to protect the rights of the disciplined employees. 30
Finally, there is no way to return to the pre-legalistic era. The parties' sophis-
tication and gap-filling-their maturity, in other words-is not going away. Thus,
a return to Paradise is not on the cards. Even banning lawyers from labor arbitra-
tion might not eliminate the legalism for which they are blamed. Human re-
sources representatives and union business agents are almost as likely as their
lawyers to use transcripts and briefs, to challenge evidence, and to cross-examine
witnesses.3 1
III. SUBSTANTIVE LEGALISM: THE INTRUSION OF STATUTORY LAW
Until the mid-1960s, labor arbitrators needed only the ability to interpret col-
lective bargaining agreements; in the less common cases of interest arbitration,
they also needed to create portions of new agreements, or at least to choose be-
tween the parties' proposals. Those duties were even within the capabilities of
nonlawyer arbitrators-a majority of the arbitration profession. Rarely did statu-
tory issues find their way into labor arbitrations.
Soon after Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964,32 however, tension
between labor contracts and external law became inescapable. The simplest and
earliest case of this tension involved the question of how an arbitrator should re-
solve a seniority dispute when the employer argued that the negotiated seniority
clause was discriminatory in intent or in effect. Title VII forbids racial discrimi-
nation. An employer seeking to correct for past discrimination (or, more cynical-
30. J. David Andrews, Legalism in Arbitration; Part II: A Management Attorney's View, 38 PROC.
OF THE NAT. ACAD. OF ARB. 191 (1986).
31. Cf THOMAS GEOGHEGAN, WHICH SIDE ARE YOU ON? 163 (2d ed. 2004).
Every staff rep or BA [Business Agent] has to function like a lawyer. The entire labor movement
is like a giant bar association of nonlicensed attorneys. I have seen them in their windbreaker and
ties, going into arbitrations, but they could be divorce lawyers, or DUI lawyers, or street lawyers,
the kind who hustle cases in traffic court: no, I think they are more like divorce lawyers, on the
14th floor of the County Building, the kind that enraged husbands pull out guns and shoot. This is
the bottom of the labor movement, eight rungs below [union presidents]. But this is the cutting
edge of labor. This is where we pick up first-step grievances and DUls. Actually this is where I
pick up some cases myself.
Id.
32. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended in 21 U.S.C. (2006)).
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ly, to avoid possible discrimination suits and create good public relations) might
favor members of protected groups over others when making promotion and
layoff decisions. Those actions often conflicted with collective bargaining provi-
sions requiring the employer to select employees by seniority.33 The problem was
particularly acute for federal contractors. Federal government contracting rules
required contractors to take "affirmative action" to ensure equality in hiring and
promotion.34 Unions naturally grieved employment decisions that rejected the
negotiated seniority rules.
This presented a dilemma for arbitrators: applying the contract and ignoring
the law would only propel the dispute into another forum, thereby delaying resolu-
tion and raising costs, but applying the law and ignoring the contract would re-
quire arbitrators to engage in statutory interpretation. That might well undermine
the very basis for judicial deference to arbitration awards: arbitrators' expertise in
discerning and applying the common law of the shop. Parties selected arbitrators,
Justice Douglas wrote in Warrior & Gulf, "because of their ability to bring to bear
considerations which may be foreign to the competence of courts. . . . The ablest
judge cannot be expected to bring the same experience and competence to bear
upon the determination of a grievance, because he cannot be similarly in-
formed."35
But surely arbitrators could not claim to be better than "the ablest judge" at
resolving statutory issues.
This tension between law and contract produced the first concern about subs-
tantive legalism in labor arbitration: if statutes applied in labor arbitration cases,
arbitrators (particularly but not exclusively nonlawyer arbitrators) might not be
capable of interpreting them accurately; if arbitrators botched that task, they
would harm both parties subject to those laws and the labor arbitration process
itself. That was no idle fear. A 1975 survey of members of the National Acade-
my of Arbitrators by Harry Edwards, then-law professor, later a judge on the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, found that few experienced arbitrators fol-
lowed developments in employment discrimination law or even understood that
field's basic concepts and terminology. Nevertheless, they felt competent to de-
cide statutory issues arising in grievance arbitrations.36
Just as the Taylor-Braden debate distilled the arguments about the procedural
nature of labor arbitration, so a new debate did the same for substantive legalism.
This time the principal debaters were Professor Bernard Meltzer of the University
of Chicago Law School and Robert Howlett, a Michigan lawyer and arbitrator.
Their dispute played out in the pages of the Proceedings of the National Academy
ofArbitrators in 1967. What should an arbitrator do when a statute conflicts with
a collective bargaining agreement? According to Meltzer, the arbitrator should
"respect the agreement and ignore the law."37 Not so, replied Howlett: not only
33. Not until 1977 did the Supreme Court uphold the validity of most seniority plans challenged
under Title VI. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
34. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965).
35. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82 (1960).
36. Harry Edwards, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Cases: An Empirical Study, 28
PROC. OF THE NAT. ACAD. OF ARB. 59 (1976).
37. Bernard Meltzer, Ruminations about Ideology, Law and Labor Arbitration, 20 PROC. OF THE
NAT. ACAD. OF ARB 1, 14-17 (1967).
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should arbitrators apply both the contract and the law, he wrote, they should
"probe" to determine whether a statutory issue is involved.38 That is, even if nei-
ther party raised a legal issue, the arbitrator should, sua sponte, investigate to see
if one might be there somewhere, and should then resolve the question the parties
did not pose. Over the next few years, others occupied positions in the debate
between those poles.39
That arbitral divide played out in actual cases as well as at professional confe-
rences. One remarkable example occurred in the late 1970s. In International
Paper Co.,40 Arbitrator F. Jay Taylor faced a seniority grievance when the em-
ployer awarded an apprenticeship to a junior black employee rather than to a se-
nior white employee.41 The employer claimed that it was subject to Executive
Order 11,246, which required it to take affirmative action to correct the underutili-
zation of minority employees. The employer further argued that its affirmative
action plan required it to award this apprenticeship to the junior employee.42
The employer's argument faced several hurdles. One was that the agreement
stated that the arbitrator "shall have no power to add to or subtract from or modify
any of the terms of this agreement." 43 Another was that a settlement of an earlier
Title VII suit declared that the agreement's seniority provisions "are not racially
discriminatory in their terms or operation."4 A third was that the company appar-
ently did not provide the arbitrator or the union with a copy of the affirmative
action plan on which it relied.45 A fourth was that Taylor was not a lawyer and
had no apparent familiarity with anti-discrimination law, let alone the legality of
seniority systems or the impact of general affirmative action plans on specific
promotion decisions.
Despite those problems, Taylor decided to plunge into the legal thicket, thus
vindicating Harry Edwards's fears about unqualified arbitrators making legal de-
terminations. Taylor ruled that the unseen affirmative action plan trumped the
seniority provisions that had been found lawful in the Title VII settlement.46 "Not
to so rule," he wrote, "places the Company in an impossible position." 47 With
admirable humility, he admitted that he did not know what he was doing:
I shall not attempt to establish conclusively with any kind of final cer-
tainty the state of the present law on this complex issue. Nor could I do
so if I were inclined. I can only make a reasonable, good-faith determi-
38. Robert G. Howlett, The Arbitrator, The NLRB, and the Courts, 20 PROC. OF THE NAT. ACAD. OF
ARB 67, 92 (1967).
39. E.g., Richard Mittenthal, The Role of Law in Arbitration, 21 PROC. OF THE NAT. ACAD. OF ARB
42 (1968); Michael Sovern, When Should Arbitrators Follow Federal Law, 23 PROC. OF THE NAT.
ACAD. OF ARB 29 (1970); and Theodore J. St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards:
A Second Look at Enterprise Wheel and its Progeny, 30 PROC. OF THE NAT. ACAD. OF ARB 29 (1977).
40. Int'l Paper Co. v. S. Kraft Div., Bastrop Mill, 69 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 857 (1977) (Taylor,
Arb.).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 859-60.
43. Id. at 858.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 860.
47. Id. at 861.
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nation that affirmative action on the Company's part was not only justi-
fied but demanded....
These facts make it quite apparent that ... the Company was particularly
vulnerable to charges of discriminatory practices. To this Arbitrator this
conclusion, which I deem valid, carries far more weight than the lengthy
testimony produced at the Hearing and the dozens of court cases cited
and analyzed by the advocates.48
Contrast Arbitrator Taylor's bravery with another arbitrator's caution. David
Feller was one of the premier labor lawyers of his generation, arguably the best
labor lawyer of the last century. A superb advocate, he successfully argued the
Trilogy cases for the Steelworkers and participated in Lincoln Mills and many
other landmark cases.49 As a law professor at the University of California-
Berkeley, he wrote the most important article ever produced about the nature and
role of collective agreements. 50 As an arbitrator, he rose to the top of his profes-
sion and served as president of the National Academy of Arbitrators. If ever there
were a labor arbitrator qualified to address statutory questions, it was he.
Shortly after Taylor issued his award, Feller faced a grievance in which an
employer (Evans Products) relied on the Fair Labor Standards Act to deny a dan-
gerous job to a seventeen-year-old applicant.5 I The collective agreement unequi-
vocally forbade discrimination "on the basis of age." 52 It also stated, in words
very like those in International Paper, that the arbitrator had no authority to
"modify or add to any of the terms and provisions of this Agreement, nor to make
any decisions on matters not covered by specific provisions of this Agreement." 53
The employer naturally wanted him to apply the statute.54 The union wanted him
to consider only the agreement.5 5
Feller declined the employer's invitation, expressly refusing to follow Tay-
lor's path.56 He held that his only authority under the contract was to decide
whether the refusal to hire violated the "specific provisions of this Agreement."
He then found that the contract forbade all ae discrimination and ordered the
employer to hire and compensate the grievant. He recognized that a court might
nullify his order, and that is just what happened-a California court vacated his
award on the basis of illegality. 59
Howlett's position was a radical departure from the way most arbitrators and
parties viewed the arbitrator's role. When Howlett sought to apply his theory, he
48. Id.
49. COOPER, ET AL., ADR IN THE WORKPLACE 194 n.4(b) (2d ed., 2005).
50. David E. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CAL. L. REV. 663
(1973).
51. Evans Prods. Co. v. Johnson Lumber Co., 70 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 526 (1978) (Feller, Arb.).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 527.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 528.
57. Id. at 529.
58. Id.
59. Evans Prods. Co. v. Millmen's Union No. 550, 205 Cal. Rptr. 731, 732 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
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did not fare well. In Roadmaster Corp., he sustained a grievance believing that
the employer's termination of a collective agreement violated the National Labor
Relations Act.60 The federal District Court overturned the award, holding that
Howlett had exceeded the scope of the submission by relying on law rather than
contract.6 1
One might have expected the Meltzer position to prevail. In fact, thirty years
later, almost all labor arbitrators regularly face and decide legal questions, al-
though not for the reasons Howlett gave or with Howlett's eagerness to probe for
issues the parties chose not to raise. All that remains is, as Marty Malin has writ-
ten, for the courts to declare Howlett the winner. 62
How did that surprising result come about? It wasn't because of Howlett's
arguments. The courts have not accepted his assertion that all contracts automati-
cally include all statutes or his prediction that the courts would not enforce arbitra-
tion awards if the arbitrator failed to consider all statutory issues. Far less have
they held that arbitrators should search for and decide legal issues the parties did
not raise. The explanation was, rather, a complex of external factors.
First, the enormous outpouring of laws regulating employment following the
Civil Rights Act-the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, and the Equal
Pay Act, among others-made it almost impossible to avoid potential conflicts
between contracts and external law.
Second, and far more importantly, the parties themselves incorporated statu-
tory law into their agreements either expressly or impliedly. 63 In the federal sec-
tor, that was a statutory requirement: all federal sector collective bargaining
agreements are subject to all applicable laws and regulations. 4 In the private
sector, parties decided that because statutes would ultimately trump conflicting
contract provisions, incorporating statutes into their collective bargaining agree-
ments (or at least into their arbitrations) was less costly and more efficient. 65
Some contract provisions make certain laws part of the bargain. Others provide
that contract provisions are to be read as consistent with relevant statutes. Still
others borrow language and principles from laws-for example, prohibiting either
party from discriminating on the basis of race, sex, and other protected categories.
Regardless of the method of incorporation, once the agreement includes statutory
principles and terms, interpreting those provisions becomes as much a part of the
arbitrator's job as interpreting any non-statutory clause. In short, arbitrators no
longer have the luxury of refusing to apply external law because the parties had
internalized it.
Finally, the parties themselves began to argue legal questions even when their
agreements did not clearly incorporate statutory law. It is one thing for an arbitra-
60. Roadmaster Corp. v. Prod & Maintenance Employees' Local 504, 655 F. Supp. 1460, 1464 (S.
D. Il. 1987).
61. Id.
62. Martin H. Malin, Revisiting the Meltzer-Howlett Debate on External Law in Labor Arbitration: I
it Time for Courts to Declare Howlett the Winner?, 24 LAB. LAW. 1, 26 (2008).
63. See, e.g., James Oldham, Arbitration and Relentless Legalization in the Workplace, 43 PROC. OF
THE NAT. ACAD. OF ARB. 23 (1991).
64. 5 U.S.C. § 7122(a)(1) (2006) (allowing the Federal Labor Relations Authority to modify or
overturn any labor arbitration award that is "contrary to any law, rule, or regulation").
65. See generally, Mittenthal, supra note 39; Oldham, supra note 63.
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tor to decline one party's invitation to act as a judge when the other party objects,
as Feller did in Evans Products.6 It is almost impossible for the arbitrator to do
so when both parties issue the invitation.
For all those reasons, arbitrators today-lawyers and nonlawyers
alike-outinely address statutory issues in their cases. There is no evidence that
their willingness to do so has resulted in unjust decisions or has harmed the labor
arbitration process. If they had, one would have expected parties to forbid their
arbitrators to decide those issues, or at least to refrain from presenting them to
arbitrators. To the contrary, their continued and expanded use of arbitrators in
such cases tells us that they are satisfied with the results.
So there is the second declination myth. There was no golden age of arbitra-
tion before substantive legalism. Arbitration before 1964 was different from cur-
rent arbitration and presumably was satisfactory for the time. It was not necessari-
ly better in any absolute sense, and that model is certainly not necessarily better
for the modem, more highly regulated era. No human sin destroyed the older
version of arbitration; the parties themselves simply decided to resolve statutory
and contractual disputes in one forum rather than in two. Nor is there any way to
put the genie back in the bottle. So long as arbitrators continue to address statuto-
ry questions to the satisfaction of labor and management, parties will continue to
use their talents.
IV. HYBRID LEGALISM: THE PYETF PANIC
The most recent concern over the legalization of labor arbitration arose fol-
lowing last year's Supreme Court Pyett decision.67 In order to appreciate that
concern, one needs first to remember the background.
Employment-that is, nonunion-arbitration largely began in 1991 when the
Supreme Court held in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.68 that at least
some individual agreements to arbitrate statutory disputes are enforceable under
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). 69 That holding gained added force a decade
later when the Supreme Court in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams70 rejected the
Ninth Circuit's position that the FAA exempted all employment contracts from its
reach.
Employment arbitration, usually through compulsory arbitration plans prom-
ulgated by employers rather than through individually negotiated agreements, has
grown enormously since Gilmer. It has proved quite different from labor arbitra-
tion. Lawyers almost always represent at least one and usually both parties. The
lawyers in employment arbitrations usually come from litigation rather than labor
law backgrounds, and they take seriously the Supreme Court's suggestion in Gil-
mer that arbitration is merely an alternative to litigation.71 As a result, they often
import the full panoply of litigation procedures into the arbitration process: dis-
66. Evans Prods. Co. v. Johnson Lumber Co., 70 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 529 (1978) (Feller, Arb.).
67. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009).
68. 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
69. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2006).
70. 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001).
71. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
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covery schedules, depositions, dispositive motions, and evidentiary objections,
among others. In addition, employment arbitration, by its very nature, involves
substantive legal disputes. Employment arbitration is even more legalistic, both
procedurally and substantively, than labor arbitration.
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Corp., the Supreme Court held that an arbi-
tration clause in a collective bargaining agreement did not bar an employee from
suing for racial discrimination even after he lost in arbitration. 72 Gilmer distin-
guished Alexander on the basis that the latter case involved an individual arbitra-
tion clause, not a collectively negotiated one, but it nevertheless rejected nearly all
the anti-arbitration positions stated by the majority in the earlier case.7 ' This led
some to believe that Gilmer undercut Alexander-if it did not overrule it.
That was certainly the Fourth Circuit's understanding. In Austin v. Owens-
Brockway Glass Container Corp.,74 a divided Fourth Circuit panel held that an
employee covered by a collective bargaining agreement containing both a nondi-
scrimination clause and a standard arbitration clause had to arbitrate his Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act claim.75 The nondiscrimination clause of the agreement
stated that "[a]ny disputes under this Article as with all other Articles of this Con-
tract shall be subject to the grievance procedure." 76 The arbitration clause was
conventional: "[a]ll disputes not settled pursuant to the [grievance procedure]
may be referred to arbitration by a notice given to the company or the union by the
other .. . ."n In a brief opinion lacking any consideration of the differences be-
tween collectively and individually negotiated arbitration agreements, the court
held that Gilmer, not Alexander, applied. Several other circuit courts quickly
disagreed.78
To resolve the circuit split, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in another
Fourth Circuit case, Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp.7 ) The circuit
court in Wright relied exclusively on its Austin decision in concluding that a rela-
tively standard labor arbitration clause obliged the employee to arbitrate his statu-
tory claims.80 The Supreme Court held that the arbitration agreement in Wright
did not "contain a clear and unmistakable waiver of the covered employees' rights
to a judicial forum for federal claims of employment discrimination."' While the
Court reserved the question of whether a clear and unmistakable waiver would
require employees to arbitrate such claims, this seemed to be its implication.82
To force employees to arbitrate their statutory claims, the Fourth Circuit cases
stretched routine arbitration provisions in ways the contracts' drafters could not
have anticipated. 83 Because the Supreme Court's decision in Wright did not ex-
72. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60 (1974).
73. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 34.
74. 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996).
75. Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 886 (4th Cir. 1996).
76. Id. at 879-80.
77. Id. at 880.
78. See, e.g., Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 363-365 (7th Cir. 1997); Brisentine v.
Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 117 F.3d 519 (1Ith Cir. 1997).
79. 525 U.S. 70 (1998).
80. Id. at 75.
81. Id. at 82.
82. Id.
83. As noted in the text, Austin's arbitration provision simply stated that all unresolved disputes
could be submitted to arbitration. Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 880
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plain whether a clear and convincing waiver would be legally effective, the Fourth
Circuit took the Court's ambiguity as a green light to continue forcing employees
covered by collective bargaining agreements to arbitrate their individual statutory
claims. In Safrit v. Cone Mills Corp.,8 for instance, it interpreted a slightly dif-
ferent, but still routine, arbitration clause as "indubitably" constituting a clear and
unmistakable waiver of the right to sue.85
Only after the Second Circuit expressly rejected the Fourth Circuit's approach
in Pyett v. Pennsylvania Building Co., did the Supreme Court reenter the fray. 86
Unlike the Fourth Circuit arbitration clauses, the one in Pyett was about as clear
and unmistakable as the Wright Court could have wished. After listing specific
federal, state, and municipal anti-discrimination laws, the agreement provided that
"All such claims shall be subject to the grievance and arbitration procedure ... as
the sole and exclusive remedy for violations. Arbitrators shall ap ly appropriate
law in rendering decisions based upon claims of discrimination." P Another ar-
ticle of the agreement stated that the arbitrator "shall . . . decide all differences
arising between the parties as to interpretation, application or performance of any
part of this Agreement and such other issues as the parties are expressly required
to arbitrate before him under the terms of this Agreement."88 The Second Circuit
did not challenge the clarity of the purported waiver.89 Instead, it held, without
qualification, that "arbitration provisions contained in a collective bargaining
agreement, which purport to waive employees' rights to a federal forum with re-
spect to statutory claims, are unenforceable" 90
Unimpressed with the Second Circuit's decision to ignore Wright's holding
that only a clear and unmistakable waiver in a collective bargaining agreement
could bar individual employees' statutory actions, the Supreme Court reversed.9 '
It went back to Alexander and noted that the arbitration clause in that case did not
clearly waive an individual's statutory rights.92 Instead, it provided only for arbi-
tration of differences "between the Company and the Union as to the meaning and
application of the provisions of this Agreement" and "any trouble aris[ing] in the
plant."93 After analyzing the "tension" between the Alexander and Gilmer lines of
cases, the majority held that "a collective-bargaining agreement that clearly and
(4th Cir. 1996). The collective bargaining agreement in Wright covered "all matters affecting wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment" and another clause provided for arbitration of
"Matters under dispute which cannot be promptly settled between the Local and an individual Employ-
er." Wright, 525 U.S. at 73.
84. 248 F.3d 306 (4th Cir. 2001)
85. Id. at 308. The parties agreed to "abide by all the requirements of Title VII" and that
"[u]nresolved grievances arising under this Section are the proper subjects for arbitration," Id. So
confident was the court of its interpretation that it stated "it is hard to imagine a waiver that would be
more definite or absolute." In fact, because the agreement did not even mention individual statutory
claims, it is hard for an objective observer to conclude that it "indubitably" waived the right to litigate
those claims.
86. Pyett v. Pa. Bldg. Co., 498 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 2007), rev'd, 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S.
Ct. 1456 (2009).
87. Id. at 90 (emphasis added).
88. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1460 (2009).
89. Pyett v. Pa. Bldg. Co., 498 F.3d at 94.
90. Id. at 93-94.
91. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1460 (2009).
92. Id. at 1469.
93. Id. at 1466.
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unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate [Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act] claims is enforceable as a matter of federal law." 94
The Court's decision led some commentators to fear that Pyett would make
labor arbitration as substantively and procedurally legalistic as employment arbi-
tration.95 Although the Pyett legalism critics do not contend that pre-Pyett labor
arbitration was perfect, they do view it as a lot better than the post-Pyett version
they expect. They also regard the Pyett decision as promising another burst of
legalism, just as did parties' decisions to use lawyers in arbitrations and to incor-
porate external law in their agreements. 96
This is a false alarm. There is no realistic possibility that Pyett-like arbitra-
tion clauses will cover a large number of employees. Look first at the Pyett arbi-
tration provision quoted above. 97 After identifying several statutes, it states une-
quivocally that "all" claims under those statutes will be resolved "exclusively" in
the grievance and arbitration process.9 Not only have I never seen an arbitration
provision that comes close to that, I never even heard of one until this case. Even
after the Supreme Court's decision, I still haven't run across another. It might
very well be unique in the country.
Next, consider the parties' bargaining goals and strategies. From a union's
perspective, there is no reason to seek or accept a waiver of employees' statutory
rights. Unions' vehement reaction against the Pyett decision reflects their ideo-
logical antipathy to such waivers. If some local union were to consider adopting
similar language, doing so would result in a political disaster once union members
learned that their negotiators had deprived them of their legal rights to sue.
Moreover, agreeing to arbitrate statutory claims would pose an enormous fi-
nancial burden on unions. Vastly increasing the scope of the arbitration clause
would sweep in many more grievances. Discrimination cases, the most likely
subject in these statutory cases, can be devilishly complex. At a minimum, they
require a lawyer, not just for the hearing but for the discovery preceding the hear-
ing. Important statutory issues could also require specially trained arbitrators, and
they would likely be more expensive. These cases would require more hearing
days, and pre-hearing arbitral work, fees, and out-of-pocket expenses would be far
greater than in other arbitrations. 99
94. Id. at 1474.
95. This controversy does not fit my theme of declension narratives as closely as the others do, but it
will suffice for a rhetorical device.
96. See, e.g., Anne C. Hodges, Fallout From 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett: Fractured Arbitration Systems
in the Unionized Workplace, 2010 J. DIsP. RESOL. 19; Michael H. LeRoy, Irreconcilable Defferences?
The Troubled Marriage of Judicial Review under the Steelworkers Trilogy and the Federal Arbitration
Act, 2010 J. DISP. RESOL. 89. LeRoy emphasizes the problems that Pyett would cause for judges re-
viewing these hybrid labor/employment arbitration. Hodges predicts that the decision will lead to
continued litigation and that negotiation of Pyett-like clauses will complicate arbitrations for unions.
97. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1460-61.
98. Id.
99. Parties might find ways to moderate the financial impact. For example, unions might require
individual grievants to pay all or some of the costs, but such and arrangement would be difficult to
design and hard to implement. In a discharge case, for instance questions of discrimination and just
cause are often inextricably intertwined. Because unions use grievance representation as a benefit to
justify dues payments, limiting representation to non-statutory cases or demanding that grievants pay
for that representation would impair the union's marketing.
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Unions thus have no reason to agree to a Pyett-like term and many reasons
not to do so. They might be swayed if employers were to offer major tradeoffs,
but how much would a Pyett-like arbitration clause be worth to a typical employ-
er? Not much, I suggest-surely not enough to gain union assent.
The current reluctance of most employers to impose mandatory employment
arbitration even for their nonunion employees is revealing. It shows that they do
not believe the benefits of mandatory arbitration are worth the costs. The down-
side of those plans for employers is that compulsory arbitration provides a forum
to many employees who would otherwise not have one. Few employees who
believe they have been discriminated against are able to obtain legal representa-
tion because the chances of prevailing are small and the potential damages are too
low to interest most lawyers. Even when employees do sue, federal courts have
been surprisingly willing to dismiss their claims on summary judgment. If statu-
tory claims can be deterred or defeated so easily in court, why would an employer
make major concessions to provide a more convenient (and perhaps more sympa-
thetic) forum for employees?
The answer is that a Pyett-like clause would be valuable to employers only if
they feared litigation more than arbitration. So long as they win most court cases
at an early stage, arbitration offers few advantages, certainly none worth a major
concession to buy the union's concurrence.
V. CONCLUSION
My conclusions should be clear from my preceding comments.
Complaints about procedural legalism in the 1950s and after exaggerated the
quality of earlier labor arbitration practices and took no account of the changing
needs and wishes of the parties. The more legalistic brand of arbitration we have
today is different, but not necessarily worse-and in many respects better-than
its predecessors.
Similarly, the complaints about substantive legalism in the 1960s and 1970s
proved fruitless. Just as parties had gradually adopted a quasi-judicial form of
arbitration, they gradually opted to present their arbitrators with statutory issues.
Rather than recoiling from the notion that arbitrators might decide statutory ques-
tions, they embraced the practice, incorporating legal dictates in their agreements,
and readily arguing those legal issues before their arbitrators. Pre-1964 labor
arbitration was different from what we see today, but on these matters it was cer-
tainly not better.
Finally, the fears that Pyett would reshape the landscape and compel
unionized employees to waive their rights to litigate statutory claims have proven
so far to be overblown and perhaps even groundless.
Creeping legalism, in other words, is a declension myth, not an accurate criti-
cism of labor arbitration. That charges of legalism are exaggerated and misaimed
does not, however, mean that arbitration is perfect. Far from it. Different bar-
gaining relationships and different cases should fall into different places on the
formality/informality continuum. Parties should adopt procedures in each in-
stance that provide the best balance of accuracy, fairness, speed, and expense. If
they decide to reduce formality, they could implement small changes, like impos-
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ing tighter deadlines for steps of the grievance procedure, or radical ones, like
"delawyering" labor arbitration.0
The over-arching point is that the parties themselves have complete control
over the degree of legalism in their arbitrations. They can have exactly what they
want. Neither arbitrators nor lawyers can force them to be more formal than they
choose. But if they choose to be more legalistic than outside critics think wise,
the outsiders should respect their choices. Their decisions about dispute resolu-
tion processes stem from their intimate knowledge of their own needs. Those
decisions, therefore, deserve as much respect as their choices on any other matter
of the bargaining relationship.
100. See Reginald Alleyne, Delawyerizing Labor Arbitration, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 93 (1989).
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